By DOUGLAS MACGREGOR
December 11, 2007
Mother Jones
This article is a good illustration of the complexity of the Iraqi conflict and why it is so hard to know what to do to improve the situation, or what is going to happen when you take any particular action.
American casualties in Iraq have declined dramatically over the last 90 days to levels not seen since 2006, and the White House has attributed the decline to the surge of 35-40,000 U.S. combat troops. But a closer look suggests a different explanation. More than two years of sectarian violence have replaced one country called Iraq with three emerging states: one Kurdish, one Sunni, and one Shiite. This created what a million additional U.S. troops could not: a strategic opportunity to capitalize on the Sunni-Shiite split. So after Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr decided to restrain his Mahdi army from attacking U.S. forces, General David Petraeus and his commanders began cutting deals with Sunni Arab insurgents, agreeing to allow these Sunnis to run their own affairs and arm their own security forces in return for cooperation with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda fighters. As part of the bargain, the Sunni leaders obtained both independence from the hated Shiite-dominated government, which pays far more attention to Tehran's interests than to Washington's, and money—lots of money.
The rest of the article is available from Mother Jones.
Tuesday, December 11, 2007
Monday, August 13, 2007
How a "Good War" in Afghanistan Went Bad
By DAVID ROHDE and DAVID E. SANGER
August 12, 2007
New York Times
Two years after the Taliban fell to an American-led coalition, a group of NATO ambassadors landed in Kabul, Afghanistan, to survey what appeared to be a triumph -- a fresh start for a country ripped apart by years of war with the Soviets and brutal repression by religious extremists.
With a senior American diplomat, R. Nicholas Burns, leading the way, they thundered around the country in Black Hawk helicopters, with little fear for their safety. They strolled quiet streets in Kandahar and sipped tea with tribal leaders. At a briefing from the United States Central Command, they were told that the Taliban were now a "spent force."
"Some of us were saying, 'Not so fast,'" Mr. Burns, now the under secretary of state for political affairs, recalled. "While not a strategic threat, a number of us assumed that the Taliban was too enmeshed in Afghan society to just disappear."
The rest of the article is available from the New York Times.
August 12, 2007
New York Times
Two years after the Taliban fell to an American-led coalition, a group of NATO ambassadors landed in Kabul, Afghanistan, to survey what appeared to be a triumph -- a fresh start for a country ripped apart by years of war with the Soviets and brutal repression by religious extremists.
With a senior American diplomat, R. Nicholas Burns, leading the way, they thundered around the country in Black Hawk helicopters, with little fear for their safety. They strolled quiet streets in Kandahar and sipped tea with tribal leaders. At a briefing from the United States Central Command, they were told that the Taliban were now a "spent force."
"Some of us were saying, 'Not so fast,'" Mr. Burns, now the under secretary of state for political affairs, recalled. "While not a strategic threat, a number of us assumed that the Taliban was too enmeshed in Afghan society to just disappear."
The rest of the article is available from the New York Times.
Sunday, August 05, 2007
Baghdad Journal: A Week in the Death of Iraq
By DR. MOHAMMED
August 5, 2007
Washington Post
When will I die? That's the question circling in my head when I awake on Wednesday. I'm sweating, as usual. My muscles ache from another long night of no electricity in weather only slightly cooler than hell. As I dress for work, other questions assail me: How will I die? Will it be a shot in the head? Will I be blown to pieces? Or be seized at a police checkpoint because of my sect, then tortured and killed and thrown out on the sidewalk?
I gaze at my wife as she sleeps, her face twisted in discomfort from the heat. What will happen to her if I die?
The rest of the article is available from the Washington Post.
August 5, 2007
Washington Post
When will I die? That's the question circling in my head when I awake on Wednesday. I'm sweating, as usual. My muscles ache from another long night of no electricity in weather only slightly cooler than hell. As I dress for work, other questions assail me: How will I die? Will it be a shot in the head? Will I be blown to pieces? Or be seized at a police checkpoint because of my sect, then tortured and killed and thrown out on the sidewalk?
I gaze at my wife as she sleeps, her face twisted in discomfort from the heat. What will happen to her if I die?
The rest of the article is available from the Washington Post.
Thursday, July 26, 2007
Exit Strategies
By KAREN DEYOUNG and THOMAS E. RICKS
July 17, 2007
Washington Post
Karen Deyoung and Tom Ricks offer a rare, sober assessment of the difficulties associated with US withdrawal from Iraq.
If U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraq in the near future, three developments would be likely to unfold. Majority Shiites would drive Sunnis out of ethnically mixed areas west to Anbar province. Southern Iraq would erupt in civil war between Shiite groups. And the Kurdish north would solidify its borders and invite a U.S. troop presence there. In short, Iraq would effectively become three separate nations.
That was the conclusion reached in recent "war games" exercises conducted for the U.S. military by retired Marine Col. Gary Anderson. "I honestly don't think it will be apocalyptic," said Anderson, who has served in Iraq and now works for a major defense contractor. But "it will be ugly."
The rest of the article is available from the Washington Post.
July 17, 2007
Washington Post
Karen Deyoung and Tom Ricks offer a rare, sober assessment of the difficulties associated with US withdrawal from Iraq.
If U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraq in the near future, three developments would be likely to unfold. Majority Shiites would drive Sunnis out of ethnically mixed areas west to Anbar province. Southern Iraq would erupt in civil war between Shiite groups. And the Kurdish north would solidify its borders and invite a U.S. troop presence there. In short, Iraq would effectively become three separate nations.
That was the conclusion reached in recent "war games" exercises conducted for the U.S. military by retired Marine Col. Gary Anderson. "I honestly don't think it will be apocalyptic," said Anderson, who has served in Iraq and now works for a major defense contractor. But "it will be ugly."
The rest of the article is available from the Washington Post.
Saturday, July 21, 2007
The Pentagon Gets a Lesson From Madison Avenue
By KAREN DEYOUNG
July 21, 2007
Washington Post
It's certainly true that popular images of the situations facing war-torn societies exert a major influence upon the behavior of the citizens in those societies. Not surprisingly, people act on the basis of what they believe to be true. It follows that military campaigns place themselves in great jeopardy if they allow citizens to develop images which question and challenge the military's efforts. This is why "information warfare" is so important and why the military is willing to engage in spin control -- and even outright deception -- as part of a broader effort to ensure favorable public reactions.
There is, unfortunately, a tendency for military leaders to forget that it's reality on the ground that is the primary driver of perceptions. When this happens, there is a danger that military leaders may become overly enamored with the power of Madison Avenue spin doctors. This article from the Washington Post highlights a situation in which this seems to have occurred.
In the advertising world, brand identity is everything. Volvo means safety. Colgate means clean. IPod means cool. But since the U.S. military invaded Iraq in 2003, its "show of force" brand has proved to have limited appeal to Iraqi consumers, according to a recent study commissioned by the U.S. military.
The key to boosting the image and effectiveness of U.S. military operations around the world involves "shaping" both the product and the marketplace, and then establishing a brand identity that places what you are selling in a positive light, said clinical psychologist Todd C. Helmus, the author of "Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation." The 211-page study, for which the U.S. Joint Forces Command paid the Rand Corp. $400,000, was released this week.
The rest of the article is available from the Washington Post.
July 21, 2007
Washington Post
It's certainly true that popular images of the situations facing war-torn societies exert a major influence upon the behavior of the citizens in those societies. Not surprisingly, people act on the basis of what they believe to be true. It follows that military campaigns place themselves in great jeopardy if they allow citizens to develop images which question and challenge the military's efforts. This is why "information warfare" is so important and why the military is willing to engage in spin control -- and even outright deception -- as part of a broader effort to ensure favorable public reactions.
There is, unfortunately, a tendency for military leaders to forget that it's reality on the ground that is the primary driver of perceptions. When this happens, there is a danger that military leaders may become overly enamored with the power of Madison Avenue spin doctors. This article from the Washington Post highlights a situation in which this seems to have occurred.
In the advertising world, brand identity is everything. Volvo means safety. Colgate means clean. IPod means cool. But since the U.S. military invaded Iraq in 2003, its "show of force" brand has proved to have limited appeal to Iraqi consumers, according to a recent study commissioned by the U.S. military.
The key to boosting the image and effectiveness of U.S. military operations around the world involves "shaping" both the product and the marketplace, and then establishing a brand identity that places what you are selling in a positive light, said clinical psychologist Todd C. Helmus, the author of "Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation." The 211-page study, for which the U.S. Joint Forces Command paid the Rand Corp. $400,000, was released this week.
The rest of the article is available from the Washington Post.
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